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Return and Volatility Spillover among Banks and Insurers: 
Evidence from Pre- and Post-Crisis Periods 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the interdependencies among the U.S., U.K., EU and Japanese 
banking and insurance industries within a VAR-BEKK multivariate-GARCH framework.  
Cross-market and cross-industry return and volatility transmissions and the changes in these 
effects during the 2007-2009 crisis are examined.  Several main results are obtained.  First, 
linkages across the banking markets considered are strong at both return and volatility levels 
and mostly of a contagious nature, especially during the crisis. Second, U.S. emerges as the 
leading provider of volatility information in the banking industry. Return transmission is also 
in effect from U.S. banks to those in EU and U.K., while Japanese banks show weaker 
integration. Third, U.S. and EU insurance markets show bidirectional return and volatility 
contagion, which remain equally strong during the crisis, while Japanese insurers are little 
affected by cross-market shocks. Fourth, global banking and global insurance portfolios 
exhibit strong return and volatility spillovers which become more potent during the crisis. 
Information about return and volatility spillovers among banks and insurers sheds light on the 
interdependencies of the world financial markets, guides hedging and diversification 
strategists and aids investment advisors and fund managers interested in accurate asset 
pricing and risk management. More importantly, understanding of the shifts in market 
linkages during stressed market conditions can help in the design of regulatory standards 
aimed at reducing the frequency and intensity of future systemic crises and formulation of 
successful monetary policy across industrialized countries. 
 
Key words: Banks, Insurers, Spillover, Contagion, Multivariate GARCH, Crisis  
JEL Classification Codes: G21, G22, G15, G01, C58	
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Return and Volatility Spillover among Banks and Insurers: 
Evidence from Pre- and Post-Crisis Periods 
1. Introduction 
In the recent decades, banking and insurance industries have witnessed a tremendous 
pace of geographic and product diversification, product convergence and consolidation at the 
domestic and international levels in response to increased deregulation 1 , heightened 
competition and advancement in technology. These trends have strengthened the degree of 
interconnectedness and widened the global scope of activity in the financial services industry, 
resulting in a financial system which is more integrated and more prone to spillover of shocks 
and crises.  Examples of spillover of crises include the U.S. market crash in 1987 (Koutmos 
and Booth, 1995), the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 (Bekaert et al., 2005) and the credit crunch of 2007-2009 
(Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010), all of which 
threatened the stability of the world financial system. 
 Product diversification by banks and insurers and convergence of the two industries 
occurred in the comparatively relaxed operating environment of the 1990s.  In the U.S., the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) allowed banking, investment banking and insurance 
services to be offered under the same umbrella through the establishment of financial services 
holding companies.  This period also witnessed a large wave of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) within and between the banking and insurance industries and within and across the 
regional borders2. The rapid pace of convergence, consolidation, integration and globalization 
of the financial industry strengthened the linkages among banks/insurers (Berger et al., 1999; 
Cummins and Xie, 2008) and across industries and national borders. These phenomena have 
																																								 																				
1Deregulatory Acts in the U.S. financial markets include: the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (1980), the Competitive Equality in Banking Act (1987), the Financial Institutions Reform 
Recovery and Enforcement Act (1989) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999). 
2 See the report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector (2001) available via the Bank for International 
Settlements’ website: http://www.bis.org. Smith and Walter (1998) have documented the increasing trend in 
cross-border M&As during the late 1980s till late 1990s across both developed and emerging economies.  
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increased the vulnerability of the international financial system to shocks and prepared the 
background for greater and more frequent turmoil (De Nicoló and Kwast, 2002)3. They have 
also increased the need for policy co-ordination and regulatory harmonization across borders 
and reduced potential gains from international portfolio diversification. 
Given the severity of economic consequences of these phenomena, clearly manifested 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, investigation of the degree of interconnectedness 
and intensity of the interactions among the global banking and/or insurance industries before 
and during this turbulent period is imperative.  Information about the mechanisms, speed and 
intensity of the return/volatility spillover among banks and insurers can shed light on the 
interdependencies of the world financial markets, guide hedging and diversification 
strategists and aid investment advisors and fund managers interested in accurate asset pricing 
and risk management (Karolyi, 1995). More importantly, this information can help in the 
design of regulatory standards worldwide aimed at reducing the intensity of future crises and 
formulation of successful coordinated monetary policies among industrialized countries. This 
study investigates the extent and nature of these spillovers. 
We make the following contributions.  First, this is the first study to investigate return 
and volatility interdependencies within and between banking and insurance industries located 
in the U.S., major European countries and Japan.  Existing studies have either focused on the 
global spillover of shocks among one particular financial intermediary (FI) type, such as 
banks or insurance companies (Elyasiani and Mansur, 2003; Carson et al., 2008), or they 
have limited their analysis to interactions among various types of FIs within a single 
economy, e.g. the U.S. (Elyasiani et al., 2007).  We extend this line of research by 
investigating the international transmission of shocks within and across banks and insurers, 
using data on the largest financial markets of the world over the 2003-2009 period. 
																																								 																				
3 Cummins and Weiss (2011) argue that core activities by the U.S. insurers do not raise systemic risk. 
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Second, we focus on market interdependencies at the industry level, rather than the 
aggregate market level, as pursued by most extant studies (Hamao et al., 1990; King and 
Wadhwani, 1990; Koutmos and Booth, 1995; Karolyi, 1995; Forbes and Rigobon, 2001).  In 
so doing, we emphasize: a) the specialness of FIs, as the origin of shock spillovers to 
industrial sectors and global financial markets, within a given economic system (Saunders 
and Cornett, 2010; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Tai, 2004), and b) sector heterogeneity in 
shock transmission and the importance of industry-specific factors in determination of the 
impact of the shocks (Campbell et al., 2001; Baca et al., 2000; Cavaglia et al., 2000). 
Understanding the interaction dynamics between banking and/or insurance industries is 
crucial to regulators and policy makers in formulating coordinated monetary policies and 
designing regulatory frameworks conducive to the stability of the financial system.  
Knowledge of these interdependencies is also useful to investors and portfolio managers in 
search of new diversification opportunities, the gains from which are highly sensitive to the 
strength of the linkages among the chosen markets.  
Third, our choice of the sample period allows us to investigate whether the cross-
market linkages within and between banking or insurance industries were altered in response 
to the 2007-2009 crisis. This will help us better delineate of the cross-market, cross-industry 
impact of the FI activities during stressed conditions at the international level (Goetzmann et 
al., 2005)4. Fourth, we employ a generalized version of the multivariate VAR-BEKK model 
introduced by Baba et al. (1989) to simultaneously evaluate the interdependencies across 
returns as well as across volatilities of industry portfolios. This approach captures the well-
documented time variation in the conditional covariance matrix of industry portfolio returns 
(Longin and Solnik, 1995; Engle, 2002); a clear advantage over the models that impose the 
																																								 																				
4 The recent crisis had two phases, it started as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the U.S. housing market in early 
2007 then transformed into a global financial meltdown in the later part of 2008 (Eichengreen et al., 2009).  
Extant studies fail to cover the entire crisis period.  For instance, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) examine the 
contagion effects of this crisis among 81 countries, but their sample period ends in February 2008. 
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restrictive assumption of constant asset correlations over time. Our model is also flexible 
enough to accommodate asymmetries in the impact of shocks to volatility, namely, it allows 
good and bad news to exert differential effects on volatility and, hence, on spillover effects.  
To preview our key results, we find evidence of international return spillover and 
volatility spillover within the banking industry with return spillovers being stronger for small 
banks but volatility spillovers showing more prominence for large banks. Return and 
volatility spillovers are also observed within the insurance industry across the countries 
included in the sample indicating integration. The exception is the Japanese financial industry 
which emerges as relatively immune to shocks from other markets, even during the crisis 
period. Moreover, we find evidence of international cross-industry linkages between banks 
and insurers. Finally, there is significant strengthening in the level of interdependence during 
the crisis period in the banking industry, though not as much in the insurance sector.  
At a more detailed level, several interesting findings are notable. First, in the banking 
sector, there is evidence of significant contagious return spillovers and of increased contagion 
effects between US, U.K and EU during the crisis period. A return spillover effect running 
from the U.S. banks to the U.K. banks, which is competitive in nature becomes contagious 
during the crisis. Same holds true of all competitive return spillover effects5. Second, the 
volatility spillover across banking portfolios is always of a contagious, rather than a 
competitive, nature and it is more prevalent than the return spillover. Moreover, our findings 
point towards the existence of an asymmetric transmission mechanism whereby negative 
																																								 																				
5 A variety of definitions appear in the literature regarding spillover and contagion effects. Spillover and 
contagion are (interchangeably) referred to when changes in prices, liquidity and/or volatility in one market are 
transmitted to others. While spillover has been embraced in the context of transmission of both first and second 
moments of prices across markets (Hamao et al., 1990); contagion has been defined as a significant increase in 
cross-market linkages after a shock to an individual country or group of countries (Forbes and Rigobon, 2001).  
Kodres and Prisker (2002) define contagion quite generally as a price movement in one market resulting from a 
shock to another market; while Kyle and Xiong (2001) refer to contagion when returns become more volatile 
and more strongly correlated.  Finally, spillover effects have been classified as ‘contagion’ when they become 
stronger during economic downturns (Allen and Gale, 2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Elyasiani et al., 2007).  
Here, we define spillover effect as the transmission of first and/or second moments of price information from 
one industry/market to another.  We refer to positive (negative) spillover as contagion (competitive) effect.	
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shocks to an industry portfolio have a disproportionately larger impact on its volatility, and, 
consequently, on spillovers to other markets, than positive shocks.  Our results also provide 
solid evidence in support of the leadership role of the U.S. banking industry as the origin of 
volatility spillovers. Prevalence of interdependence limits the gains due to international 
diversification and furthers the need for policy co-ordination among the countries considered. 
Third, insurance markets emerge as strongly interconnected across regions, with 
mostly contagious return and/or volatility shocks from all other insurance markets, while 
Japanese insurers are largely insulated from international shocks indicating its segregation 
from the latter markets. Interestingly, in no case there is a shift in the magnitude of the return 
spillover effects among the insurers worldwide during the crisis period, an indication that the 
insurance industry was less heavily affected by the crisis, than the banking industry. 
Finally, globally aggregated bank and insurance portfolios emerge as strongly inter 
related. There is evidence of contagion in returns spillover running from the insurance 
industry to the banking industry, which significantly strengthens during the crisis. The 
competitive return spillover effect running from banks to insurers during the crisis, can be 
attributed to the fact that insurers benefited from bankers misfortune because of flight to 
quality. Volatility transmission between the two industries is strong and bidirectional. 
Our findings bear important implications for the regulatory objective of improving the 
resilience of financial institutions to stressed market conditions. The significant rise in cross-
market dependence of banking sectors should be embedded in determining bank capital 
requirements as envisaged in the Basel III proposal (2011) for the introduction of stressed 
Value at Risk (VaR).  Further, the rise in the extent of interdependence between global bank 
and insurance portfolios during periods of market stress should be factored in risk 
management practices of FIs in the light of regulatory initiatives for reduction of systemic 
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risk. Finally, the finding that Japanese FIs are largely immune to shocks from other markets 
points to a direction for diversification for international investors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section two provides a brief overview 
of the literature. Section three describes the dataset and the estimation framework. Section 
four analyzes the empirical findings on the interdependence among banking and insurance 
industries across regions.  Section five concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Among the early studies of return/volatility spillover across FIs, Eun and Shim (1989) 
discover the dominance of return spillovers originating from the U.S. to nine major 
economies during 1979-1985; while Hamao et al. (1990) and King and Wadhwani (1990) 
unveil the prevalence of volatility spillovers from the U.S. to Japan and the U.K. during the 
1987 stock market crash.  These studies are, however, limited to only one type of spillover 
effect (either return or volatility) due to the shortcomings of their estimation frameworks. 
Subsequently, Koutmos and Booth (1995) and Karolyi (1995) use a simultaneous equation 
system of return and volatility spillovers and confirm the dominance of the U.S. market 
during the 1987 market crash. In the same vein, Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) find significant 
return spillover effects running from the U.S. to the German banks, but not to the banks in the 
Japanese market. Based on regionally syndicated indices, Bekaert et al. (2005) also unveil 
spillovers from the U.S. to Europe, Asia and Latin America during 1980-1986. 
Focusing on corporate announcements, Lang and Stulz (1992) show that bankruptcy 
announcements by banks can have a negative effect on other banks, which is in line with 
Kaufman’s (1994) argument that failure of one bank can spread to the rest of the banking 
system through bank runs.  In a similar fashion, liquidity-related announcements (secondary 
equity offerings) and profit-related announcements (dividend cuts) by banks can impact the 
banking sector in a contagious manner (Slovin et al., 1992; Bessler and Nohel, 2000). As an 
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example, Slovin et al. (1999) provide evidence that dividend cuts by U.S. regional banks 
exerted a competitive effect on their geographic rivals during 1975-1992. 
More recently, Bartram et al. (2007) confirm the prevalence of spillovers across 
European countries and show that these countries are indeed more integrated in the aftermath 
of the introduction of the Euro than before.  Dungey and Martin (2007) offer strong evidence 
of cross-market links between currency and equity markets during the 1997-1998 Asian 
crisis.  Elyasiani et al. (2007) and Carson et al. (2008) focus, respectively, on the spillover 
among banks, insurers and investment banks and among different types of insurers (accident 
and health, life, property and casualty), within the U.S. market during 1991-2001.  The 
former study shows that return (volatility) spillovers among the small institutions are stronger 
(weaker) compared to larger ones; while the latter study reveals strong (weak) return 
(volatility) spillover among the sub-sectors of the insurance industry. 
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer (2010) investigate the bank run in the U.K. 
during the failure of Northern Rock (September 2007) and reinforce Kaufman’s (1994) theory 
of transmission of bank failures via bank runs.  Looking at market indices, Asgharian and 
Nossman (2011) offer evidence in support of the dominance of the U.S. market as the price 
and volatility information provider during 1982-2007.  Eichengreen et al. (2009) suggest that 
during the 2007-2009 crisis default probabilities of large international banks, measured by 
their credit default swap (CDS) spreads, were interrelated, especially after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers.  Elyasiani et al. (2011) find that FIs which accepted the U.S. government 
rescue funding (TARP) had a positive impact spillover to the ones which did not. 
While the existing literature has identified a number of interdependencies, it has failed 
to investigate the return and volatility interdependencies simultaneously.  Moreover, given 
the pervasive time variations in market and sector correlations, the  employment of basic 
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constant correlation models and broad indices6, rather than sector-specific portfolios,  to 
investigate the integration of equity markets is likely to produce unreliable conclusions and 
policy implications.  Similarly, focusing on a single type of FI, or on a single geographic 
market and/or industry can be misleading as it overlooks the prevailing high cross-industry, 
cross-market.  We employ a comprehensive framework to avoid these shortcomings. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1.   Data 
We focus on two types of FIs: banks and insurers (life / non-life), and investigate the 
interdependencies within and between these FIs across geographical regions during normal 
economic conditions as well as crisis conditions.  The sample includes the U.S., European, 
and Japanese banking and insurance industries. The European sample comprises France, 
Germany, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, considered as a single portfolio in the Euro area 
(EU) while the U.K. banking and insurance firms are considered as a separate portfolio 
because U.K. is not a part of the Euro zone7. The sample period spans from January 1, 2003 
to March 9, 2009 encompassing the recent financial crisis, which started on April 2, 2007 and 
ended on March 9, 20098.  Equity prices, stock market indices, long-term government bond 
yields (for Japan, the U.S., and the U.K.), syndicate EU long-term benchmark bond yield (for 
the EU countries) and trade-weighted foreign exchange indices (for the Euro, Japanese Yen, 
British Pound and U.S. Dollar) are collected from DataStream International.  Prices are 
																																								 																				
6 Several studies examine the spillover effects among regional markets (e.g. European, Latin American, and 
Asian markets in Bekaert et al., 2005) by investigating the influence of these markets on an individual national 
market.  However, conventional regional indices contain all national market indices within the region, which 
introduces bias into the analysis of spillover effects.  On the other hand, modified regional indices exclude the 
country under examination from the index (Asgharian and Nossman, 2011; Bartram et al., 2007). 
7
	The 2010 Global Financial Stability Report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reveals that the 
combined EU, Japanese, U.K. and U.S. banking assets amount to over 60% of the global banking industry.  The 
2010 SIGMA report by Swiss Re also shows that over 75% of the insurance premiums in 2009 was generated 
by the North American, Western European and Japanese insurers.	
8 On April 2, 2007, the largest U.S. sub-prime lender - New Century Financial - filed for bankruptcy.  On March 
9, 2009, major equity markets reached their lowest levels during the crisis period, and recorded the biggest 
single day rally since 2007 in the following day (See Appendix 1). 
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reported in local currencies to avoid any potential bias due to relative currency fluctuations.  
In order to eliminate the issue of survivorship bias while maximizing the sample size, at any 
point in time the dataset contains all listed institutions whose stocks are actively traded. 
For each country, equally-weighted portfolios are constructed for the banking and 
insurance industries separately. All banking (insurance) firms within the EU region; 
Germany, French, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, form the EU banking (insurance) industry 
portfolio.  As mentioned earlier, EU is treated as a single market due to the adoption of the 
Euro and the efforts of the EU countries to align their financial/legal frameworks.  The 
sample starts in 2003 to avoid the early years of Euro as a single currency. In order to account 
for the institutions’ size effect, banks are sorted into large and small-size portfolios based on 
their market capitalizations, using the top quartile market cap as the threshold.  These size-
based portfolios are rebalanced monthly to reflect variations in the market capitalization and 
to ensure that at any point in time the banks in the large size portfolio are the main players in 
the industry.  The number of insurance firms within each market does not permit further 
disaggregation into meaningful size portfolios.  Similarly, the number of banks in the U.K. is 
too small to form portfolios of different sizes. 
The summary statistics of the industry close to close logarithmic portfolio returns over 
the entire sample period are presented in Table 1.  Leptokurtosis in the portfolio return 
distribution evidenced by the kurtosis statistic and normality test, and volatility clustering 
evidenced by the Ljung-Box test on the squared returns support the use of the non-linear 
GARCH estimation framework adopted here. The mean portfolio returns reported in Table 1 
illustrate that banking and insurance portfolios were strongly affected by the recent financial 
crisis with the effect on bank returns being more solid than that on the insurer returns. While 
before the crisis, all portfolios earned positive mean returns, which were particularly high for 
the insurance sectors, they all suffered huge losses during the crisis period.  The U.K. banks 
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and the U.S. insurers were the most severely affected among their peer institutions.  As a 
result, the average daily returns over the entire sample period (2003-09) are negative for all 
the portfolios of all regions (Row 1). A graphical depiction of the banks/insurers equity 
values, presented in Appendix 1, documents the strong degree of co-movement among FIs in 
the U.S., U.K. and Europe, which is not mirrored by those in Japan. 
TABLE 1 
Looking into cross-border market interdependencies requires accounting for different 
trading time zones.  The Tokyo Stock Exchange opens at GMT 0:00 and closes at GMT 6:00; 
followed by the London Stock Exchange opening at GMT 8:00 and ending at GMT 16:30.  
The New York Stock Exchange operates from GMT 14:30 to GMT 21:00.  Thus, the daily 
price information generated from Japan and the U.K. is likely to influence the U.S. the same 
day, the U.S. market will affect Japan and the U.K. the next day and Japan will be affected by 
the U.K. the following day.  Non-synchronous trading is addressed by adjusting for these 
time-lags in the model.  The advantages of daily return data used here include the following: 
a) they capture the short-lived spillover effects among financial assets better than weekly and 
monthly data (Eun and Shim, 1989; Hamao et al., 1990, De Santis and Gerard, 1997), and b) 
they provide more observation points and, thus, enhance the estimation efficiency. On the 
negative side, daily data are subject to more noise. 
3.2. Model and Estimation Framework  
Our estimation framework is based on the diagonal VAR-BEKK model (Baba, Engle, 
Kraft and Kroner (1989) aiming to capture the return and volatility transmissions among 
portfolio equity returns.  Existing studies have employed a constant correlation model 
(Elyasiani et al., 2007) in spite of the evidence that correlations are time-varying (Cappiello 
et al., 2006).  The BEKK framework facilitates the estimation of the conditional multivariate 
covariance matrix (Ht) of asset returns and can accommodate the time variation in return co-
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movement.  Moreover, simultaneous estimation of the industry portfolios’ conditional mean 
returns and covariance matrix improves parameter estimation efficiency and produces more 
reliable inferences.  The mean return equation (eq. 1 below) is specified as a multifactor 
equation9.  The factors include unexpected changes, estimated via an appropriate-lag ARMA 
filter, in daily holding period returns of long-term government bonds, trade-weighted foreign 
exchange indices and national/regional stock market indices.  Interdependencies between 
domestic and foreign banks (insurers) are conceptualized as spillovers of returns and 
volatilities from foreign FIs in either of the two industries.  Changes in industry 
interdependencies during the 2007-2009 financial turmoil are captured by the use of 
interaction dummies with cross-return and cross-volatility regressors with the dummy taking 
the value of 1 during the April 2, 2007 – March 9, 2009 period.  The four equation system 
describing the returns on industry portfolios of the EU, Japan, U.K. and U.S., can be 
presented in a matrix form as follows: 
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  where:  
° is the Hadamard product (element-by-element multiplication of two matrices)  
Rt is a [k × 1] vector representing the bank/insurance portfolio returns (ri,t) over day t, while k 
refers to the number of portfolios employed.  i ∈ [EU, JP, UK, US] represents the European, 
Japanese, the U.K. and the U.S. market, respectively. 
																																								 																				
9 The expected impacts of the risk factors on portfolio returns are available on request. 
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β is a [k × 4] parameter matrix with the first column representing the constants, while the 
second to fourth columns represent market (βi,MKT), foreign exchange rate (βi,FX) and interest 
rate (βi,IR) betas for the corresponding portfolios. 
Ft = a [k × 4] matrix with the first column representing the constants.  The second to fourth 
column contain the market (rmi,t), foreign exchange (FXi,t) and interest rate (IRi,t) risk factors 
for the corresponding portfolios over day t, proxied by the wide market return, the 
unexpected changes in trade-weighted currency index return, and the unexpected changes in 
daily holding period return of long-term government bond, respectively. 
1 is a k-dimensional column vector of unities. 
Rt* is a [k × k-1] matrix of lagged returns according to non-synchronous trading adjustment. 
Θ is a [k × k-1] matrix with parameters (θij) representing the return transmission effects over 
the sample period10.  θij represents the return transmission effect from a portfolio (banking or 
insurance) in market j to a portfolio in market i over the sample period.  That is, looking at 
the first line of the Θ matrix, we can see the impact of the Japanese (θEU,JP), the U.K. (θEU,UK) 
and the U.S. (θEU,US) sector portfolios on the EU sector portfolio for the sample period. 
Γ is a [k × k-1] matrix with parameters (γij) representing the change in the return transmission 
effect from a portfolio (banking or insurance) in market j to a portfolio in market i over the 
crisis period.  That is, looking at the first line of the Γ matrix, we can see the incremental 
impact of the Japanese (γEU,JP), the U.K. (γEU,UK) and the U.S. (γEU,US) sector portfolios on the 
EU sector portfolio during the crisis period. 
D is the crisis dummy; D = 0 before April 2, 2007 and D = 1 afterwards. 
The error terms (εit) from each mean equation are assumed to follow a multivariate 
normal distribution with zero mean and conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht, which 
																																								 																				
10 The parameter matrix Θ measures the return transmission for the pre-crisis period and Γ measures the change 
during the crisis period.  Same holds for the conditional variance coefficient matrices (G, Z).  
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evolves over time according to an extended BEKK framework. We employ a diagonal BEKK 
multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) specification (Engle and Kroner, 1995) to model the 
evolution of the conditional covariance matrix (Ht) of the portfolios in the four markets and 
extend it to incorporate cross-market volatility transmission effects.  The extended BEKK-
MGARCH model incorporating the spillover dynamics in the conditional covariance matrix 
can be described as equation 2 below:11  
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where Ht is a [k × k] matrix representing the conditional variance-covariance matrix of the 
error term (εt) over day t, while k refers to the number of portfolios employed. 
εt is the [k × 1] day-t vector of error terms from the conditional mean equation (1). 
C is a [k × k] lower triangle matrix. The product of CC’ represents the unconditional part of 
the conditional variance-covariance matrix. 
A and B are [k × k] diagonal parameter matrices dictating the multivariate ARCH and 
GARCH evolution of the conditional covariance matrix (Ht). 
Ht* is a [k × k-1] matrix of lagged conditional variances (hi,t) from Ht according to non-
synchronous trading adjustment. 
I is a [k × k] identity matrix. 
G is a [k × k-1] matrix of parameters (gij) representing the volatility transmission from 
portfolio in market j to portfolio in market i in the pre-crisis period. That is, looking at the 
first line of the G matrix, we can see the impact of the Japanese (gEU,JP), the U.K. (gEU,UK) and 
the U.S. (gEU,US) sector portfolios on the EU sector portfolio during the pre-crisis period. 
																																								 																				
11 This system is a four equation model, with sector portfolios from EU, Japanese, U.K. and U.S. markets. 
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Z = a [k × k-1] parameter matrix with parameters (zij) representing the change in volatility 
transmission effect during the crisis period.  zij represents the change in volatility 
transmission effects from the portfolio in market j to the portfolio in market i during the crisis 
period.  That is, looking at the first line of the Z matrix, we can see the change in the impact 
of the Japanese (zEU,JP), the U.K. (zEU,UK) and the U.S. (zEU,US) sector portfolios on the EU 
sector portfolio during the crisis period.  D is as defined before. 
 In the proposed model, we assume that the volatility originating from the financial 
sector portfolio in one market can influence the volatility of portfolios in the other markets 
considered, but will not explicitly affect the covariance (correlation) between these portfolios. 
The rationale is threefold. First, Bekaert et al. (2005) have argued that changes in correlations 
among financial markets are due to changes in the common risk factors, not of volatility 
transmission.  Therefore, it is unnecessary to introduce a full parameter matrix to incorporate 
volatility transmission effects on correlations. Second, the main purpose of our study is to 
investigate the cross-sectional return/volatility spillover across the domestic and international 
markets, not changes in correlations due to volatility spillover effects12. Third, by using a 
diagonal parameter matrix for volatility spillover we achieve parsimony and estimation 
tractability advancing the efficiency of the parameter estimates as a result.   
The BEKK model can be extended to allow for asymmetry in the conditional 
variances and covariances. The asymmetric BEKK model allows for negative shocks to have 
a disproportionately bigger impact on the portfolio’s own variance and on its covariance with 
other portfolios than positive news do. This model can be described as follows:  
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12
	The variance inflation factors (VIF) for the exogenous variables (Ft , R
*
t) in the mean equation (1) are in the 
range of 1.2 to 2.1; well below the critical value of 10.  Multicollinearity can also be largely ruled out for the 
regressors in the variance equation (2) as the VIFs for the fitted variances (Ht-1 , H
*
t) are below the critical value 
for 12 out of 14 of the sector portfolios. For the two exceptions correlations were high only in the crisis period.  	
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In this model ηt is an indicator function I[εt < 0] ° εt  where ° indicates the Hadamard product, 
and N is a [k × k] diagonal parameter matrix that captures the incremental effect of the past 
negative shocks on the covariance matrix (Ht). Our estimation and inferences are based on the 
non-normality-robust quasi-maximum likelihood framework of Bollerslev and Wooldridge 
(1992) in the context of models that jointly parameterize conditional mean and covariance. 
4. Empirical Results 
In this section we discuss our findings based on the extended VAR-BEKK model 
delineated in the previous section used to estimate the return and volatility interdependencies 
among banking and insurance portfolios in the EU, Japan, U.K. and the U.S.  Demarcation of 
significant links between banking and insurance industries among the major markets 
considered unveils the interaction of these markets before and during the turmoil of 2007-
2009, i.e. how markets affected one another during the ordinary times and the crisis period. 
Several sets of results are discussed.  First, results of joint hypothesis tests on 
multidirectional and unidirectional return and volatility interdependence (Tables 2-3).  
Second, detailed results on return and volatility transmission among banking portfolios across 
different geographic markets (Table 4).  Third, results based on the extended model allowing 
for asymmetric effects (Table 5).  Fourth, results on return and volatility transmission among 
insurance industry portfolios across different geographic markets (Table 6).  Fifth, shock 
transmission effects between large (small) banking portfolios across different regions (not 
tabulated due to space limitation).  Sixth, results on cross-industry shock transmission 
running from the U.S. banking portfolio to insurance portfolios of the remaining markets 
(Table 7). Seventh, results on interdependencies between global banking and global insurance 
portfolios (Table 8).  Given that insurers have performed differently than banks during the 
recent crisis (Eling and Schmeiser, 2010; Harrington, 2009), it is interesting to examine the 
empirical evidence on cross-industry transmission using data from global capital markets in 
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these two industries in order to determine to what extent the banking crisis influenced the 
insurance industry.  Our analysis takes a U.S. perspective and primarily focuses on 
transmission effects from the U.S. to the other three markets and vice versa13. 
4.1.   Industry Interdependence across Geographic Markets 
Factors contributing to linkages among financial markets are several: a) these markets 
are influenced by similar macroeconomic/financial risk factors (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002); 
b) they are affected by actions of their ”common creditors” such as shifting investments 
across markets (liquidity effect)14; c) they have trade interactions (Glick and Rose, 1999); d) 
they are subject to coordinated policy actions of the governments; and e) they have all 
undergone consolidations that combine banking, investment banking and insurance activities 
under one umbrella (De Nicoló et al., 2004). Two additional factors strengthen these 
linkages.  First, FIs use similar models/techniques of risk measurement and risk management 
and, thus, expose themselves to similar risks. Second, advancement in technology allows 
speedy transmission of information across markets/industries and intensifies the shocks 
introduced to any of the markets/industries (Karolyi, 1995).   Bekaert et al. (2005) have found 
that linkages among markets have increased during the last two decades.  If market/industry 
movements are in the same direction, the phenomenon reflects common information spillover 
and is referred to as contagion; while movements in opposite directions represent competitive 
effects (see footnote 5).  To investigate shock spillovers among FIs in different financial 
markets, we formulate the following eight joint hypotheses on return and volatility spillovers 
and their changes during the crisis and conduct tests of their validity by imposing parametric 
restrictions on the conditional mean and variance equations (1-2) in our model:   
																																								 																				
13 The justification for this approach is that the U.S. market was the epicentre of the subprime mortgage crisis, 
which was later “transmitted” into the insurance sector and spread across geographic borders and transformed 
into a global financial crisis (Blackburn, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009). 
14 The common creditors are “global investors”, e.g., institutional investors, who concurrently operate in 
different markets and shift their investments in search of assets with higher liquidity (Vayanos, 2004), better 
credit quality (Eichengreen et al., 2009), or international diversification of their financial portfolios. 
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Multidirectional Return Interdependencies across Markets: 
H1:  No cross-market return transmission in the pre- or post-crisis period (Θ = Γ = 0). 
H2:  Cross-market return transmissions are identical in the pre- or post-crisis period (Γ = 0). 
Multidirectional Volatility Interdependencies across Markets: 
H3:  No cross-market volatility transmission in the pre- or post-crisis period (G = Z = 0). 
H4:  Cross-market volatility transmissions are identical in the pre- or post-crisis period (Z = 0). 
Unidirectional Return and Volatility Transmissions across Markets: 
H5:  No cross-market return/volatility transmission from the EU industry portfolios towards 
industry-based portfolios in the other markets (Japan, U.K., U.S.) in the pre- or post-crisis period. 
H6:  No cross-market return/volatility transmission from the Japanese industry portfolios towards 
industry portfolios in the other markets (EU, U.K., U.S.) in the pre- or post-crisis period. 
H7:  No cross-market return/volatility transmission from the U.K. industry portfolio towards 
industry portfolios in the other markets (EU, Japan, U.S.) in the pre- or post-crisis period. 
H8:  No cross-market return/volatility transmission from the U.S. industry portfolios towards 
industry portfolios in the other markets (EU, Japan, U.K.) in the pre- or post-crisis period. 
Table 2 and 3 present the likelihood ratio (LR) test results of the aforementioned joint 
hypotheses of interdependence15.  In Table 2, rows 1-2 show the test results for the null 
hypotheses (H1) of zero return interdependence across the banking markets and across the 
insurance markets, respectively.  Rows 3-4 test whether these interdependencies changed 
during the crisis period (H2).  Rows 5-8 report the corresponding results on volatility 
interdependence (H3, H4). The LR test statistics for hypotheses (H1-H4) are highly significant 
for all subsamples of FIs examined, indicating that spillovers were in effect at both return and 
volatility levels and that these linkages did alter during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The 
only case where the null hypothesis is not rejected is H2 for the insurer portfolios, indicating 
that return transmission among insurers did not change during the crisis period. 
																																								 																				
15 The LR test is carried out by assessing the difference in log-likelihood ratios (LLR) of the unrestricted and 
restricted versions of the VAR-BEKK model (equations 1–2) according to a given hypothesis.  
20 
	
TABLE 2 
When large and small banks are separated (columns 2-3), the return spillover 
hypothesis (H1) is found to be slightly more prominent across smaller banks, compared to 
their larger counterparts, while the volatility interdependence and the shifts in return/volatility 
interdependence during the crisis are all stronger for the larger banks. The prominence of 
return spillover for smaller banks can be attributed to costliness of information collection and 
the resulting herding behavior. Given the paucity of information on smaller banks and the 
greater cost of information collection for these firms (Calvo and Mendoza, 2000), some 
investors/institutions with lack of access to information prefer to follow other investors/ 
institutions or to “herd”, to a greater extent than in the case of large institutions. The greater 
volatility spillover, and the greater shift in return/volatility spillover during the crisis, for the 
large banks are to be expected because common risk factors are more prevalent for large 
banks, especially during crises, due to their tendency to consolidate and become global (De 
Nicoló et al., 2004, DeYoung et al., 2009). 
Table 3 summarizes the test results for hypotheses H5-H8, which investigate the return 
and volatility spillover effects from the industry-based portfolio in one market to those of the 
same industry in the remaining markets. The results indicate that financial markets across 
major economies are tightly connected as the null hypothesis of no return and volatility 
spillovers from one market to the remaining markets is rejected for all industry-based 
portfolios.  These results hold for the aggregate industry portfolios as well as the large and 
small banking portfolios (columns 2-3).  However, return and volatility spillovers originating 
from the U.S. towards other markets (the EU, Japan and the U.K.) are stronger as the LR test 
statistics for the U.S. industry-based portfolios are notably greater than the ones originating 
from other markets, regardless of the size and type of the institution (banks and insurers) 
examined.  This finding is consistent with previous empirical studies, which find the U.S. 
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market to play a “leadership role” in price and volatility information transmission (Hamao et 
al., 1990; Asgharian and Nossman, 2011).  It follows that policy makers and market 
participants outside the U.S. have to pay attention to the developments in the U.S. market as 
well as those of their own markets. In particular, the policy makers in the former regions 
would benefit from policy co-ordination with policy makers in the U.S.   Comparatively, the 
spillover effects originating from the Japanese banking portfolios seem to have the least 
impact on the banking portfolios in the other markets as indicated by the relative size of the 
LR statistic (H6 in Table 3). These results mirror the argument that relative to other developed 
markets, Japan has a more closed economy (Lawrence and Krugman, 1987; Flath, 2005). 
TABLE 3 
4.2.1.   Interdependence across Banking Markets 
Table 4 presents the VAR-BEKK estimation results for the spillover of return and 
volatility shocks among banking portfolios across different geographic markets. The spillover 
effects for the pre-crisis period as well as the shifts in the magnitude of the effects during the 
crisis of 2007-2009, relative to the pre-crisis period, are produced 16. The latter effects are 
derived by introducing interaction terms between cross-returns or cross-volatilities and the 
crisis dummy17.  Each column in Table 4 represents a shock-receiving market (EU, Japan, 
U.K., U.S.).  Rows 1-6 (7-12) of a given column present the return (volatility) spillover 
effects from the other three markets in the order they appear in the table (EU, Japan, U.K., 
U.S.). For example rows 1-3, column 1 show the effect on the EU market of a shock in Japan, 
U.K., and U.S., respectively. Similarly, rows 1-3 of column 2 show the effect on Japan of a 
shock in the EU, U.K. and U.S. and rows 4-6 show the shift in the effect during the crisis. 
																																								 																				
16 The estimates for parameter matrices A and B in equation 2, that drive the evolution of the covariance matrix, 
are available on request. As a robustness check we also present the estimated parameters obtained from the 
baseline BEKK model with no spillover effects in the conditional variance (G = Z =0).  The results largely 
coincide with the ones from equation (2). This serves to alleviate concerns regarding adverse effects of the 
contemporaneous correlation among the fitted variances of the different portfolios on the latter specification.  
17 To obtain the magnitude of the spillover during the crisis period, the coefficient obtained for the pre-crisis 
period and the coefficient of the interaction term obtained for the crisis period should be added up (footnote 10). 
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TABLE 4 
Figures reported in Table 4 unveil some interesting results. First, there are significant 
return spillovers across the banking markets, three positive and three negative cases, 
indicating contagion and competitive effects, respectively.  Cases of contagion include Japan 
to EU, U.K. to EU and EU to the U.K.  Cases of a competitive effect include transmission of 
return shocks from EU to the U.S., U.S. to U.K., and U.K. to Japan before the crisis period.  
These latter three cases indicate the presence of rivalry between the corresponding pairs of 
geographic markets considered within the worldwide banking industry. Second, volatility 
spillovers across different geographic banking markets are in all cases of a contagious nature, 
indicating that volatility shocks to any of these banking markets would get transmitted to 
others in the same direction, elevating systemic risk. 
Third, and more interestingly, during the crisis period of 2007-2009, the spillovers in 
returns across geographic markets alter in character and overwhelmingly support the presence 
of contagion during the market turmoil, based on the signs and the magnitudes of the 
interaction terms (rows 4-6). In all cases the competitive return spillover effect observed 
during the pre-crisis period changes to contagion effect during the crisis, as suggested by the 
positive sum of the cross-return coefficient and the coefficient of the interaction term. For 
instance, the return effect of the U.S. banks on the U.K. bank returns changes direction from 
negative (-0.161) in ordinary times  to positive (0.273) as a result of a shift during the crisis 
period, indicating the strengthening of contagion forces at the expense of the competitive 
effects18. In other cases the pre-existing contagion sustains itself or further strengthens; in no 
case we observe a weakening of the contagion in returns during the crisis.  
The volatility spillover also generally maintains its potency or strengthens during the 
crisis (rows 10-12). In two cases the volatility spillover does weaken during the crisis; 
																																								 																				
18  Values reported for the cross-market spillover effects are per 1 unit change in the same or different industry. 
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transmission of volatility from the U.K. to EU and from EU to Japan.  These lesser volatility 
spillover effects may have been caused by reduced market activity due to the frozen state of 
financial markets in response to high uncertainty and the unusual volatility observed during 
some phases of the crisis. This is an indication that results of ordinary times cannot be 
generalized to crisis conditions and that spillover need not necessarily strengthen in all cases. 
Some effects manifest themselves in a significant manner only during the crisis. For instance, 
the U.S. does not demonstrate any return transmission to the EU banking sector before the 
crisis, but it does exhibit a positive effect during the crisis period.  Overall, these findings call 
for increased regulatory attention to the banking industry at the global level, along with the 
domestic markets, and the need for policy coordination among the regions because of their 
implications on systemic risk. 
Fourth, most of the spillover effects are found to be asymmetric in terms of direction.  
For example, during the crisis, the statistically significant increase in return transmission 
from EU banks to their U.S. counterparts is substantially greater (0.298) than the reverse 
effect (0.115).  Volatility spillover is present from the U.S. to EU (0.013 and significant) but 
not in the opposite direction (insignificant). This calls for greater attention to the markets 
which play a leadership role in originating or curbing the shocks.  Fifth, some other results 
are also notable.  The spillover in returns can be quite dissimilar to that in volatility.  
Particularly, in the case of the U.S. and Japanese banks, neither side has a return effect on the 
other even during the crisis, while both sides do exert a positive and mutual impact on one 
another’s volatility, raising concern about systemic risk at the world level.  While the lack of 
return spillover between the U.S. and Japan stands in contrast to some previous studies 
showing positive return transmission from Japan to the U.S. (Karolyi and Stulz, 1996; Peek 
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and Rosengren, 1997)19, it is consistent with the closed nature of the Japanese economy.  This 
result is also in line with Elyasiani and Mansur (2003) who find insignificant return spillover 
from the Japanese banking sector to its U.S. counterpart and with Eun and Shim (1989), 
Hamao et al. (1990) and Koutmos and Booth (1995) documenting that price information 
generated from the Japanese equity market has no influence on the U.S. equity market.   
The lack of return transmission between the U.S. and Japan may be, at least partially, 
due to the differences in the financial systems of these two countries.  Under the bank-
orientated system, adopted by Japan, financial resources of the public are mainly collected 
and distributed via bank retail deposits (Allen and Gale, 2001)20, while under the market-
orientated system, adopted by the U.S., banks’ financing depends on the wholesale money 
and inter-bank market flows21.  To be more specific, during the crisis period, the wholesale 
money/interbank market dried up quickly as banks were highly reluctant to provide funding 
and liquidity to one another22.  As a result, liquidity shortages in the interbank market had a 
greater impact on banks in the U.S. financial system than those in the Japanese financial 
system23.  In particular, when the U.S. banks suffered from low funding liquidity and were 
																																								 																				
19 It is notable that the economic condition during the sample period 1988 to 1995, adopted by Karolyi and Stulz 
(1996) and Peek and Rosengren (1997) is different from ours.   In the late 1980s, Japanese banks were the main 
credit supplier to the U.S. economy (Peek and Rosengren, 1997).  Therefore, shocks in the Japanese banking 
sector had a positive impact on the U.S. financial market as the former directly influenced the liquidity condition 
in the latter.  However, after the deep recession experienced by Japan in the early 1990s, Japanese FIs no longer 
played a dominant role in global financial markets.  It is also possible that the nature of return generating models 
used in earlier studies where the volatility interaction dynamics are ignored biases the measurement of the shock 
transmission effects. Indeed, the return spillovers may be an artifact of volatility interdependence. 
20 Data from Japanese Bankers Association show that on average more than 68% of the Japanese banking assets 
is financed by retail deposits over the sample period.  Backus et al. (2009) show that the Japanese saving rate 
was more than 30% of their GDP for most of the 44-year period from 1960 to 2004. In contrast, the U.S. 
national saving rate was only around 15% and dropped by almost 50% in the late 1990s (Page 21, Figure 1). 
21  See further discussion in Beck and Levine (2002), Blackburn (2008), and Goldsmith-Pinkham and 
Yorulmazer (2010).  Data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) show that on average only 
around 46% of the U.S. banks’ assets are financed by retail deposits (03/2003–03/2009). 
22 Acharya and Merrouche (2010) and Ashcraft et al. (2011) show that the interbank lending market ‘freeze’ 
during the crisis period was mainly due to the precautionary hoarding of liquidity by banks.  Precautionary 
hoarding occurs when banks hold more reserve and liquidity than the level needed to self-insure against shocks. 
This reduces the amount of available funding for interbank loan market. 
23 De Nicoló et al. (2004) suggest that retail deposits are the fundamental funding channel in a financial system, 
which is more reliable and stable compared to wholesale money market instruments.  Therefore, banks financed 
through retail deposits enjoy a lower funding risk. 
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forced to de-leverage, their asset values dropped considerably due to the loss spiral24 while 
Japanese banks were influenced to a smaller extent because their liquidity position was 
relatively strong and more resilient to the liquidity shocks. 
4.2.2.   Robustness of Bank Spillovers to the Size of the firm and the Sign of the shocks 
In order to investigate the robustness of our findings, we conduct further tests by 
disaggregating the banks in the sample according to their size.  Detailed results are not 
reported but are available upon request.  Our results unveil only minor differences in 
spillover patterns of large and small banks.  Specifically, the magnitude of return (volatility) 
transmission seems to be stronger for small (large) banking portfolios consistent with our 
joint hypothesis test results in Table 225. We also deploy the asymmetric BEKK specification 
(eq 3) to allow for the possibility of asymmetric response of the conditional variance (ht) to 
negative and positive shocks) of the same magnitude. The incremental effect of bad news, 
compared to good news, is represented by the parameter matrix N. Presence of asymmetric 
effects in the volatility of a given market, validated by significance of matrix N, implies 
asymmetric propagation of negative versus positive shocks to other markets.  The results 
from the asymmetric BEKK model are displayed in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
According to the parameter estimates reported in Table 5, no significant asymmetric 
effects (ni) exist in the volatility of the banking sector portfolios across the four markets.  
Nonetheless, when the banking portfolios are disaggregated by size, significant asymmetries 
do manifest themselves.  Specifically, large EU and U.S. banks respond more vigorously to 
bad news than to good news with the incremental effects of bad news being 0.088 and 0.031, 
respectively. This implies that under adverse market conditions volatility shocks to large 
																																								 																				
24 For further discussion on the liquidity and loss spirals, refer to Blackburn (2008), Brunnermeier (2009) and 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
25 Elyasiani et al. (2007) find similar results based on spillover effects among the U.S. financial institutions. 
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banks in these countries will have a more potent effect on their counterparts in other 
countries.  This phenomenon also holds for small EU banks for which bad news increase 
volatility by 0.040 more than good news do. This asymmetric transmission process could be a 
potential source behind the significant contagion effects associated with U.S. and EU banks. 
4.2.3.   Factors Driving Global Bank Spillovers 
The spillover effects observed across banking sector portfolios can be mainly 
attributed to the following three elements. First, according to the Financial Stability Report 
2008, issued by the Bank of England, the U.K./U.S. banks had $192/$195 billion invested in 
structured products.  This extensive common investment by the U.K./U.S. banks in products 
such as mortgage-backed securities and structured investment vehicles (SIVs) originating in 
other regions, as well as the common holding of these products by banks in other regions 
considered, strengthened the potential for co-movement between these markets. Since 
investment in structured products was concentrated within the large banks, it was conducive 
to stronger volatility spillover among these banks.  Second, the massive and simultaneous 
write-offs of the SIVs and liquidity shortages in the interbank market during the crisis were 
fundamental to pervasiveness, strength and duration of the effect of the shocks received 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). The fact that large banks were more heavily dependent on money 
market sources of funds and, hence, affected more severely by liquidity shortages, 
contributed to greater volatility spillover among them.  Third, increased integration and 
globalization of financial markets in recent years (DeYoung et al., 2009) has increased the 
risk similarities among different types of FIs and across regions.  These trends have led to 
common sources of underlying risk across FIs as well as adoption of similar risk assessment/ 
management models by these institutions (Carey and Stulz, 2006), exacerbating FI 
interdependencies and heightening systemic risk, especially during the economic downturn.   
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Shifts in the prevailing returns/volatility spillovers during the crisis can be similarly 
attributed to three elements.  First, a sharp reduction in the appetite for risk within the global 
investment community including banks (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 2008) triggered massive short 
positions in ‘poor quality’ mortgage-related structured products in international markets 
(Demyanyk and Hemert, 2009) and the well-known freeze of these markets.  Second, the fair 
value accounting practice, known to engender pro-cyclicality and asset bubbles, led to the 
sharpening of the collapse in the market (Allen and Carletti, 2008).  To elaborate, a 
‘synchronized’ decrease in asset values across markets during the crisis exacerbated 
interdependencies among FIs as they were forced to write-down many of their investments 
from their balance sheets simultaneously, curtailing their market values (Blackburn, 2008; 
Brunnermeier, 2009).  Third, the larger average size of the financial firms due to M&As in 
the recent decades and the greater level of concentration in the banking sectors led to stronger 
reactions by market players to any given shock to the system, further strengthening the 
interconnectedness of the financial industries (De Nicoló et al., 2004). 
Finally, when size is taken into account, the findings on return and volatility spillover 
on large and small banks and their changes during the crisis are also consistent with the 
aforementioned arguments. The extent of similarity of risks among large FIs is positively 
associated with industry concentration (Carey and Stulz, 2006).  As large FIs diversify into 
more products and enter new geographical regions, their similarities increase and ultimately 
lead to provision of similar products in similar regions (De Nicoló and Kwast, 2002).  This 
view is reinforced by Cetorelli et al. (2007) who claim that dominant players in financial 
markets are becoming more and more alike and will be exposed to a greater number of 
common risk factors.  Moreover, as consolidated FIs are likely to obtain more funding via the 
interbank markets, they tend to become exposed to similar funding and liquidity risks as well 
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(Berger et al., 1999).  All these forces strengthen the potency of spillover across FIs and can, 
at least partially, explain the greater volatility contagion across larger firms. 
4.2.4.   Interdependence across Insurance Markets 
Results for interdependencies across the international insurance industries are 
presented in Table 6. The format of the table is the same as Table 4. Analyzing the spillover 
effects among the four insurance markets considered (EU, Japan, U.K. and U.S.) unveils 
some notable results. First, all statistically significant return spillovers are of contagious 
nature, most of them pertaining to EU and the U.K, indicating a direct (positive) co-
movement across the insurance markets. There is significant return interdependence between 
the EU and US sectors, whereas cross-market linkages with the Japanese insurance sector are 
relatively weaker. These findings indicate that the insurance sectors in the EU, UK, and US 
markets are subject to the same faith; they all do well or they all suffer, rather than one 
benefiting at the expense of another. This feature strengthens the contribution of the 
insurance industry worldwide to systemic risk.  
TABLE 6 
Second, unlike the banking sector, there are no shifts in the magnitude of the return 
spillover effects during the crisis period, indicating a lower scale of impact from the crisis on 
the insurance industry, compared to the banking industry. Third, cases of volatility spillover 
are infrequent and limited to EU and the U.S., denoting a lesser degree of integration among 
insurers, compared to banks.  Fourth, according to the (unreported) asymmetric BEKK 
results, the incremental impact of negative shocks pertaining to EU insurers compared to the 
positive shocks stands at 0.025 and it is significant at the 1% level but insignificant for all 
other markets. Therefore, this asymmetric transmission mechanism could be the main driver 
behind the significant contagion effects found from the EU to the U.S. insurance portfolio.  
Fifth, significant shifts in volatility effects during the crisis period are also limited to EU and 
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the U.S.  Again, this is an indication that the insurance industry was not as substantially 
affected by the recent downturn, as the banking industry, and it contributed to a lesser extent 
to the systemic risk. 
A few of the pair-wise results are notable.  We find bidirectional positive return, as 
well as volatility transmission effects, between the EU and the U.S. insurers, with volatility 
spillover from EU to the U.S. strengthening during the crisis. These results indicate mutual 
contagion between the EU and U.S. insurance markets and a potential for raising systemic 
risk.  In the case of the U.S. and the U.K., the return transmission effect runs from the U.S. to 
the U.K., reflecting the leadership role of the former, while the volatility transmission runs in 
the reverse direction. These results remain valid also during the crisis period with no 
significant changes in magnitudes of the effects. The U.K. and EU demonstrate strong 
bidirectional and symmetric return interdependence which remains unaltered during the crisis. 
Volatility spillover between these two markets is unidirectional from the U.K. to EU with a 
negative sign before the crisis, indicating a competitive effect, but it becomes a contagion 
effect during the crisis.  These findings suggest that volatility shocks to the U.K. insurer 
market have a calming effect on EU, except during the crisis when they show contagion.  
The Japanese insurance industry emerges as unaffected in terms of both return and 
volatility spillover shocks from the other markets.  Specifically, only the U.K. and EU affect 
the Japanese insurer returns and they do so weakly, while the U.S. market fails to exert a 
return effect on Japan and there is no volatility spillover from any of the other markets (U.S., 
U.K., EU).  Besides, there are no significant shifts in these return or volatility transmission 
effects during the crisis period. Nevertheless, the Japanese insurance industry does exert 
effects on both returns and volatilities of some other insurance markets.  Return transmissions 
from Japan to the U.K. and EU are positive and significant and remain unchanged during the 
crisis period.  However, the volatility transmission effects from the Japanese insurers towards 
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all other markets are insignificant in the pre-crisis period though they do become significant 
during the crisis for EU and the U.K. (negative) and for the U.S. (positive).  The 
interpretation is that heightened volatility in the Japanese insurance industry during the crisis 
had a calming effect on the former two markets (competitive), but it did result in increased 
fluctuations in the U.S. market (contagion). The negative signs of volatility spillover effects 
from Japan on the insurance sectors in EU and the U.K. during the crisis reflect the 
prevalence of rivalry between the latter and the insurance sector in Japan..	 The positive 
volatility impact from Japan on the U.S. is mainly due to the common risk factors shared by 
insurers across the two markets, e.g., the considerable write-offs of their financial assets 
during the crisis (Harrington, 2009).   
The findings that return transmission effects across the insurance markets considered 
remain universally unchanged during the crisis for all of these markets (insignificant shifts 
due to crisis) may be because the nature of the common risk factors was unaffected in the 
post-crisis period.  The finding of shifts in volatility co-movement during the crisis can be 
attributed to the sharp decrease in financial asset values held by the insurers in these markets 
and the consequent increase in their default probabilities.  Since the default probability can be 
measured by the variability of a firm’s equity value (Zhang et al., 2009), the increase in 
default probability of insurers operating across different markets enhances their volatility 
interdependence during the crisis. 
In summary, our results establish interdependencies among the insurance sectors of 
the markets under consideration at both return and/or volatility levels, rejecting the null 
hypotheses H1 and H3, though these interdependencies are weaker than those among the 
banking industries and, hence, potentially contributed less to the systemic risk. Our H2 
hypothesis purporting insignificant changes in the intensity of return spillover among insurers 
during the crisis cannot be rejected.  Our H4 hypothesis purporting insignificant changes in 
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the intensity of volatility spillover during the crisis does get rejected in some cases. This 
result, which is found to be driven by the life insurer component of the industry, is suggestive 
of some changes in the nature of interdependencies in response to the crisis.26 
4.3.   Cross-market and Cross-industry Spillover: U.S. Bank Effects on Global Insurers 
Over the years, insurance companies have gone closer to the banking firms in terms of 
their products and services under the umbrella of financial conglomerates (Staikouras, 2006; 
Saunders and Cornett, 2010). For example, insurers have invested heavily in mortgage-
backed securities and have issued new instruments of financing, similar to those issued by 
banks27.  Given their current sets of operations, one would expect that there are strong links 
between the insurance industry and the U.S. banking sector.  The focus of our analysis is on 
the two-way channel between the U.S. banking market and the three geographic insurance 
markets considered (EU, Japan and U.K.). Results from the VAR-BEKK model describing 
the interdependence between these two industries are presented in Table 7. 
TABLE 7  
 According to the parameter estimates reported in Table 7, the U.S. banking sector is 
unaffected by the concurrent returns generated in the EU, Japanese and the U.K. insurance 
markets during the pre-crisis period and affected only by the U.K. insurers during the crisis 
period.  In this latter case, the spillover is positive and strong, indicating robust cross-market 
contagion from U.K. to the U.S. that needs to be watched, especially in conditions of industry 
downturns.  In terms of magnitude, a 1% point change in the U.K. insurers’ equity returns 
results in 0.259% points change in the U.S. banking equity returns in the same direction.   
																																								 																				
26
 A breakdown of the results by type of insurance business is available from the authors upon request. 
27 Insurance-linked securities (ILS) are a special type of asset-backed security issued by insurers/reinsurers to 
enhance their funding ability and to transfer their underwriting risk to capital market.  There are many different 
products that can be categorized as ILS, such as CAT-bond, CAT-option, sidecars, CAT-equity puts, 
catastrophic risk swaps, industry loss warranties and weather derivatives (Cummins, 2005). 
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The strong positive return spillover between U.S. banks and U.K. insurers might be 
attributed to the fact that these firms were exposed to similar risks during the market 
downturn, including extensive investments in real-estate-related assets and tight connections 
with global markets. For example, U.K. insurers had more than 15% of their assets invested 
in real estate loans during the downturn and around 20% of their net premium income was 
generated from overseas markets 28. Insurance sectors in the other regions exert no significant 
effect on U.S. banks.   
The cross-market spillover from the U.S. banks to the three insurance markets 
considered is more often significant than the shocks in the reverse direction reflecting 
asymmetric effects.  However, the effect still emerges to be relatively weak.  In terms of 
return transmission, we observe that while EU insurers are unaffected by the U.S. banking 
sector, U.K. and Japanese insurers are impacted by 0.08% and 0.221%, respectively, for a 1% 
shock to the U.S. banking sector. These effects remain unchanged during the crisis period. 
Our findings are an indication of cross-industry return contagion across major geographic 
markets in the world. These interdependencies should be taken into account by managers of 
the insurance firms as well as investors in the equity markets and regulators of financial 
institutions in seeking ways to protect the insurer firms, investments in insurer stocks and 
systemic risk, respectively. An interesting question in this context would be whether 
promotion of universal banking in the U.S. (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 1999) and other 
markets considered weakens or strengthens such cross-industry linkages. This effect is likely 
to be positive because when banks and insurers operate under the same umbrella they would 
have a greater degree of business activity with one another and would be affected by the risk 
emanating from same affiliates and by decisions made by the same parent organization. 
																																								 																				
28 The real estate loan holding comes mainly from non-life insurance sector. The data are collected from the 
SIGMA – Insurance Investment in a Challenging Global Environment (2010) report by Swiss Re.  See also 
documents issued by Association of British Insurers (ABI) including the U.K. Insurance – Key Facts and the 
Annual General Insurance Overview Statistics; available from www.abi.org.uk. 
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Looking at the volatility interdependencies, increased U.S. bank volatility is found to 
be transmitted only to the EU insurers and even that only during the crisis and at the meager 
level of 0.006, for a 1% shock to the U.S. banking sector.  It does not seem that the U.S. 
banking industry is in a position to exert a marked pure contagion effect on the insurance 
industries considered and to threaten a systemic collapse. The observed link between banking 
and insurance industries across geographical regions is contributed to by the two-way direct 
investment between the U.S. and these regions, their trade relationships and their exposure to 
similar financial risks e.g. credit risk, off balance sheet risk, and interest rate risk (See also 
Cummins and Trainar, 2009; Cummins and Weiss, 2009). 
4.4.   Cross-Industry Transmission Effects: Global Banking and Insurance Markets 
It is known that insurers were not as severely affected by the recent crisis as banks.  
The report from The Geneva Association29 shows that most insurers were able to absorb the 
credit losses within their own balance sheets during the crisis. In the U.S., around six hundred 
banks were rescued by the Troubled Asset Rescue Program (TARP) while only three 
insurance companies needed funding from the government30.  Thus, it would be interesting to 
examine any transmission or co-movement effects across the banking and insurance 
industries at a global level. To this end, we construct an aggregated banking (insurance) 
portfolio, which contains all the banks (insurers) across the four major markets considered. 
 Estimation results, presented in Table 8, suggest strong and almost symmetric 
volatility transmission between the aggregate bank and insurance sectors over the sample 
period (0.019 from banks to insurers and 0.015 in the opposite direction). The bidirectional 
volatility interdependence between the global banking and insurance industries highlights 
their risk sharing characteristics. These characteristics are the result of changing financial 
markets, convergence between banks and insurers (Staikouras, 2006; Saunders and Cornett, 
																																								 																				
29 The report is titled Systemic Risk in Insurance. An analysis of insurance and financial stability (March 2010). 
30 Based on a report by the U.S. Treasury titled Financial Stability Transactions Report (July 2009). 
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2010) and the use of identical models of risk assessment and similar risk management 
procedures.  The slightly stronger impact from banks on insurers can be attributed to the fact 
that insurers do face the risk factors to which banks are exposed, though banks are not 
exposed to certain insurance risks, which are exclusive to insurers. Moreover, the banking 
industry is greater in size and can exert a larger effect. The volatility interactions between the 
two sectors remain unaffected by the crisis.  
TABLE 8 
The prevailing bidirectional return transmission between the two industries is found to 
be economically more relevant during the crisis. Specifically, the aggregate banking portfolio 
experienced a return transmission of 0.038 from the aggregated insurance sector in the pre-
crisis period, with the return effect strengthening considerably during the crisis (by 0.103 
points).  In the reverse direction, the aggregated insurance portfolio was unaffected by the 
fluctuations in the aggregated banking sector return before the crisis, but did experience a 
return spillover effect from it during the crisis period. This effect is of a competitive character 
and its magnitude stands at -0.126, an indication that when the world banking industry is in 
trouble, the world insurance industry stands to gain in terms of profitability, possibly because 
banking customers switch over to insurers for many banking-like products.  The negative 
return transmission from banks to insurers during the crisis also provides support for the 
‘flight-to-quality’ argument proposed by Lang and Nakamura (1995). To elaborate, the 
increase in investor risk aversion during the crisis, led them to switch to insurance companies, 
which were performing relatively better than banks.  Along the same lines, Caramazza et al. 
(2004) find support for the ‘flight-to-quality’ trend during the 1987 U.S. crisis, 1994 Mexican 
peso devaluation, and the 1997 Asian turmoil. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study investigates the interdependencies among the banking and insurance 
industries in the EU, Japan, U.K. and U.S. markets. Transmissions of shocks in returns and in 
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volatility are both considered. Changes in the magnitude and nature of these cross-market/ 
industry return and volatility transmissions during the crisis of 2007-2009 are also 
investigated in order to shed light on the impact of the crisis on the global financial dynamics.   
The findings suggest that return contagion among the banking industries in the EU, 
U.K. and U.S. is strong, especially during the crisis period. This calls for regulatory attention 
in designing a co-ordinated regulatory landscape as well as the need for co-ordination of 
monetary policy across the industrialized world. As an exception, the connections between 
the banking sectors in the Japanese and the U.S. markets seem to be weak as no return 
spillover is recorded between these two markets even during the crisis period.  One source of 
dissimilarity in effects across different regional banking markets is their structural 
differences. To elaborate, since U.S. is a market-oriented economy while Japan is a bank-
oriented economy, banks in these two countries are operating in different environments and, 
consequently, have different attitudes towards competition and risk taking.  Our findings also 
document the prominence of the U.S. banking sector as the main origin of volatility 
information to its EU, Japanese and U.K. counterparts demonstrating its continuing 
leadership role in global markets and the asymmetry of volatility contagion mechanisms.  
For the insurance sector, once again the EU, U.K. and the U.S. markets show strong 
linkages. Positive and significant return spillovers are documented on the EU and U.K. 
markets while the effects on U.S. and Japan are more limited.  Unlike banks, the magnitudes 
of the return spillovers across insurance markets remain unaltered during the crisis period, 
perhaps because the risk factors faced by the insurers were not affected by the turmoil.  
However, volatility spillovers to the U.S. and EU insurance sectors do intensify during the 
crisis period raising concerns about contribution of the insurance sector to systemic risk.  The 
U.S. insurance sector receives contagion type volatility spillovers from the U.K. and the EU 
insurance markets with the former intensifying during the crisis. The increase in default 
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probability due to the sharp decline in asset values could be the reason behind the stronger 
volatility linkage across the insurance portfolios during the crisis. As an exception, Japanese 
insurers appear to be mostly insulated from shocks originating in other markets even during 
the crisis, reflecting the segmented nature of the Japanese markets.   
 In regards to interdependence between banks and insurers, at the country/aggregate 
market level, we find that the U.S. banking sector affects the returns on the U.K. and 
Japanese and the volatility of the EU insurance industries. The interdependence among global 
banking and insurance portfolios is bidirectional and strong, again validating concerns over 
systemic risk. This finding is in line with the trend of integration between the two financial 
intermediary types over the last two decades. There is also evidence of contagious volatility 
transmission between the two industries. The spillover in returns, mostly evident during the 
crisis, is of a competitive nature and favors the insurance industry in the sense that when 
banks suffer, insurers benefit by attracting their customers (‘flight-to-quality’ effect).  
Industrial reports and empirical studies on the general performance of the global banking and 
insurance sectors also confirm our empirical results31. Our findings highlight the importance 
of monitoring and managing the contagion effects at the international level and the need to 
design an appropriate regulatory framework to curb it.  Further globalization of financial 
markets, advancement of technology and the consolidation trend among “Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions” intensify this necessity.   
																																								 																				
31 For industrial reports, please refer to report Systemic Risk in Insurance, An analysis of insurance and financial 
stability (2010) by Geneva Association, and the report Eight Key Messages on the Financial Turmoil (2008) by 
CEA.  Both reports claim that insurers are less exposed to the credit risk and liquidity risk compared to banks, 
and the insurance industry is less involved in the mortgage related security market.  For empirical studies, please 
refer to Harrington (2009) and Eling and Schmeiser (2010) among others. 
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Table 1.        Summary Statistics of the Financial Sector Portfolio Returns 
Bank EU Japan U.K. U.S. 
Raw Return (%) All 
 
Small 
 
Large 
 
All 
 
Small 
 
Large 
 
All 
 
All 
 
Small 
 
Large 
 
1  Mean -0.048 
 
-0.037 
 
-0.088 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.093 
 
-0.086 
 
-0.105 
 
2 Mean-Pre
†
 0.060 
 
0.065 
 
0.043 
 
0.040 
 
0.032 
 
0.060 
 
0.003 
 
0.009 
 
0.008 
 
0.017 
 
3 Mean-Post
††
 -0.288 
 
-0.263 
 
-0.378 
 
-0.166 
 
-0.150 
 
-0.229 
 
-0.275 
 
-0.321 
 
-0.295 
 
-0.375 
 
4  Maximum 6.615 
 
4.864 
 
13.289 
 
13.467 
 
13.207 
 
15.026 
 
15.174 
 
10.811 
 
9.770 
 
14.029 
 
5  Minimum -6.627 
 
-5.694 
 
-10.825 
 
-8.665 
 
-8.006 
 
-12.262 
 
-11.634 
 
-13.951 
 
-12.675 
 
-18.092 
 
6  Std. Dev. 0.872 
 
0.723 
 
1.642 
 
1.571 
 
1.504 
 
1.970 
 
1.768 
 
1.434 
 
1.278 
 
2.197 
 
Distribution Property  
                   
7 Skewness -0.940 
 
-1.350 
 
-0.215 
 
0.193 
 
0.270 
 
0.069 
 
0.038 
 
-1.469 
 
-1.959 
 
-0.765 
 
8 Kurtosis 13.237 
 
14.097 
 
13.514 
 
9.559 
 
9.828 
 
9.181 
 
17.499 
 
28.416 
 
34.583 
 
9.062 
 
9 Normality Test 6486 *** 7810 *** 6630 *** 2585 *** 2809 *** 2289 *** 12588 *** 39196 *** 60643 *** 15587 *** 
10 LB Test 327.3 *** 343.6 *** 343.3 *** 442.6 *** 441.5 *** 464.0 *** 256.6 *** 539.2 *** 535.4 *** 540.9 *** 
11 ADF Test -21.7 *** -20.4 *** -35.4 *** -39.1 *** -39.6 *** -37.8 *** -24.0 *** -12.1 *** -7.4 *** -9.62 *** 
 
  
Insurance EU Japan UK US 
The sample period is from the January 1, 2003 to March 9, 2009. 
Data sample adjusted for non-trading days: 1,437 observations. 
† “Mean-Pre” refers to the average daily return of the sector portfolio from January 1, 2003 to April 1, 2007. 
†† “Mean-Post” refers to the average daily return of the sector portfolio from April 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009. 
The Normality Test is conducted following the Jarque-Bera test statistic.  
The LB Test refers to the Ljung-Box Q-test for dependence in the squared returns. 
The ADF Test refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root test.  
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Raw Return (%) All 
 
All 
 
All 
 
All 
 
1  Mean -0.041   -0.021 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.075   
2 Mean-Pre 0.055   0.101 
 
0.048 
 
0.039 
 
3 Mean-Post -0.254   -0.294 
 
-0.139 
 
-0.328 
 
4  Maximum 6.009 
 
12.328 
 
5.202 
 
8.781   
5  Minimum -7.770 
 
-17.581 
 
-5.054 
 
-16.563   
6  Std. Dev. 1.108   2.487 
 
0.876 
 
1.727   
Distribution Property  
      
  
7  Skewness -0.695   -0.382 
 
-0.188 
 
-1.729   
8  Kurtosis 9.305 
 
9.863 
 
7.272 
 
21.164   
9 Normality Test 2496 *** 2855 *** 1101 *** 20469 *** 
10 LB Test 405.3 *** 530.0 *** 429.7 *** 597.7 *** 
11 ADF Test -22.6 *** -37.7 *** -36.6 *** -9.3 *** 
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Table 2.        Joint-Hypothesis Tests for Multidirectional Return and Volatility Interdependencies 
  
  
Log-likelihood Ratio Test Statistics (LLR) and 
Degrees of Freedom (DF)
†
 
 
 
  All
††
 Large
†††
 Small
†††
 
 Return Interdependence  DF LLR DF LLR DF LLR 
1 H1:  No return transmission across sector portfolios Bank 24 990 *** 12 66 *** 12 74 *** 
2        θi,j = 0 and γi,j = 0  with i≠ j Insurance 24 108 *** 
      3 H2:  No change in return transmission over the crisis period Bank 12 914 *** 6 100 *** 6 12 * 
4        γi,j = 0  with i ≠ j Insurance 12 12 
        Volatility Interdependences 
 
DF LLR DF LLR DF LLR 
5 H3:  No volatility transmission across sector portfolios Bank 24 144 *** 12 106 *** 12 26 ** 
6         gi,j = 0 and zi,j =i 0  with i ≠ j Insurance 24 208 *** 
      7 H4:  No change in volatility transmission over the crisis period Bank 12 338 *** 6 42 *** 6 16 ** 
8         zi,j = 0  with i ≠ j Insurance 12 36 *** 
      
The LLR represents the test statistic of the log-likelihood ratio test. DF denotes the degrees of freedom of the associated Chi-squared distribution. 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
The unrestricted model for H1-H4 is the VAR-BEKK model proposed in the methodology section without restrictions on any of the parameters. 
†  The LLR test is based on two systems of equations (restricted/unrestricted) from the four markets using either bank or insurance portfolios.  
†† The “All Bank/Insurance” test is based on the aggregated banking/insurance sector with all the banks/insurers from each market.  
††† For the banking portfolio only the U.S., Japan and EU samples have enough firms to be disaggregated by size (small versus large). Therefore, the “Large/Small Bank” test is based on the 
large/small banking portfolio across the U.S., Japanese and EU markets. 
Note: The test result for H1 (H3), which examines the overall return (volatility) transmission effect among the banking/insurance portfolios during the whole sample period, is illustrated in 
row 1/2 (row 5/6).  
The test result for H2 (H4), which examines the potential alterations in the return (volatility) transmission effect among the banking/insurance portfolios during the crisis period, is illustrated 
in row 3/4 (row 7/8).  
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Table 3.        Joint-Hypothesis Tests for Unidirectional Return and Volatility Interdependencies 
 
  
Log-likelihood Ratio Test Statistics (LLR) and 
Degrees of Freedom (DF)
†
 
 
 
  All
††
 Large
†††
 Small
†††
 
 
 
 DF LLR DF LLR DF LLR 
1 H5:  No return and volatility transmission from the EU sector   
        Portfolios 
Bank 6 40 *** 4 142 *** 4 130 *** 
2 Insurance 6 12 * 
      
3 H6:  No return and volatility transmission from the Japanese sector  
        Portfolios 
Bank 6 16 ** 4 112 *** 4 58 *** 
4 Insurance 6 20 *** 
      
5 H7:  No return and volatility transmission from the U.K. sector  
        Portfolios 
Bank 6 32 *** N/A N/A 
6 Insurance 6 52 *** N/A N/A 
7 H8:  No return and volatility transmission from the U.S. sector  
        Portfolios 
Bank 6 68 *** 4 282 *** 4 162 *** 
8 Insurance 6 138 *** 
      
The LLR represents the test statistic of the log-likelihood ratio test. DF denotes the degrees of freedom of the associated Chi-squared distribution. 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
The unrestricted model for H5-H8 is the VAR-BEKK model proposed in the methodology section without restrictions on any of the parameters. 
†  The LLR test is based on two systems of equations (restricted/unrestricted) from the four markets using either bank or insurance portfolios.  
†† The “All Bank/Insurance” test is based on the aggregated banking/insurance sector with all the banks/insurers from each market.  
††† For the banking portfolio only the U.S., Japan and EU samples have enough firms to be disaggregated by size; small versus large. Therefore, the “Large/Small Bank” test is 
based on the large/small banking portfolio across the U.S., Japanese and EU markets. 
N/A stands for non-available data due to limited number of firms to form meaningful size portfolios. 
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Table 4.        Shock Transmission across Banking Sectors of Different Regions: EU, Japan, U.K., U.S.  
The following table summarizes the return and volatility transmission effects among all size banking portfolios across markets.  The all size banking 
portfolio contains all banks in one market.  The first three rows in each panel show the spillover effects while the next three rows show the shift in 
spillover during the crisis.  The estimated transmission coefficients are categorized as return and volatility transmission effects.  
 
 
 
Impacted Markets 
 
  
EU 
  
Japan 
  
U.K. 
  
U.S. 
  Return Transmission Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   
1 Cross-Return 1 (θi1)  0.024 2.20 ** 0.031 0.56  
0.151 2.46 ** -0.069 -2.97 *** 
2 Cross-Return 2 (θi2)  0.033 2.51 ** -0.066 -2.52 ** 0.005 0.15  
0.002 0.22 
 
3 Cross-Return 3 (θi3)  -0.021 -0.82  
0.046 0.72 
 
-0.161 -2.56 ** 0.015 1.12 
 
4 Change in Cross-Return 1 (γi1)  0.014 0.63  
-0.075 -0.91 
 
-0.090 -0.89 
 
0.298 2.70 *** 
5 Change in Cross-Return 2 (γi2)  -0.024 -1.23  
0.075 2.10 ** -0.027 -0.54 
 
-0.042 -1.13 
 
6 Change in Cross-Return 3 (γi3)  0.115 3.67 *** -0.031 -0.47  
0.273 2.77 *** 0.136 2.31 ** 
 Volatility Transmission 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
7 Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) -0.002 -1.27  
0.008 1.85 * 0.050 1.84 * 0.039 1.61 
 
8 Cross-Volatility 2 (gi2) 0.005 1.98 ** 0.012 1.20  
0.038 1.09 
 
0.006 2.89 *** 
9 Cross-Volatility 3 (gi3) 0.013 3.23 *** 0.062 3.02 *** 0.089 3.47 *** 0.002 0.73  
10 Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) 0.008 1.93 * -0.019 -4.26 *** 0.044 1.44  
0.013 0.53 
 
11 Change in Cross-Volatility 2 (zi2) -0.007 -2.32 ** 0.000 0.73  
0.005 0.93 
 
0.040 0.56 
 
12 Change in Cross-Volatility 3 (zi3) -0.006 -1.02  
0.016 0.77 
 
0.027 1.78 * 0.057 1.68 * 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Cross-return/volatility i (i = 1-3, rows 1-3 / rows 7-9) represent the return (θi)/volatility (gi) transmission from each of the three markets to the fourth during the whole sample period.  
That is, looking at the EU column, the impact of the Japanese, U.K. and the U.S. banks on the EU banking portfolio is represented by the coefficients numbered as 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively.  Similarly, for the Japanese banks, the impact of the EU, U.K. and the U.S. banking portfolios on the Japanese banking portfolio is measured by the coefficients numbered 
as 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  The same pattern applies for the remaining countries. For instance, the impact of the cross-return/volatility spillover of the UK on the US market is 
0.015/0.002.   
Change in Cross-return/volatility i (i = 1-3, rows 4-6 / rows 10-12) represent the change in the return (γi)/volatility (zi) transmission from each of the three countries to the fourth during 
the crisis period.  That is, looking at the EU column, the incremental impact of the Japanese, U.K. and the U.S. banks on the EU banking portfolio is represented by the coefficients 
numbered as 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  Similarly, for the Japanese banks, the incremental impact of the EU, U.K. and the U.S. banking portfolios on the Japanese banking portfolio is 
measured by the coefficients numbered as 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  The same pattern applies for the remaining countries.  For instance, the change of the cross-return/volatility spillover 
of the UK on the US market is 0.0136/0.057. 
Note: The full magnitude of the cross-sectional return and volatility transmission effect over the crisis period is given by (θi + γi) and (gi + zi), respectively.  That is, the total cross-
return/volatility spillover of the UK on the US market is 0.136/0.057 (0.015 + 0.0136 / 0.002 + 0.057).  Note here that insignificant coefficients are not taken into account. 
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Table 5.       Volatility Parameters from the Asymmetric BEKK Model 
The following table reports the parameter estimates driving the conditional volatility of the 
banking sector portfolios across markets for the aggregate banking sector and for the two 
size banking portfolios. 
 
 Parameters a
2
i b
2
i n
2
i 
Market All Size Banking Portfolio 
EU 0.018  *** 0.967  *** 0.029 
Japan 0.024  *** 0.976  *** 0.003 
U.K. 0.189  *** 0.875  *** 0.000 
U.S. 0.137  *** 0.888  *** 0.001 
 Large Banking Portfolio 
EU 0.002  *** 0.956  ***               0.088  ***    
Japan 0.071  *** 0.908  *** 0.000 
U.S. 0.053  *** 0.929  ***               0.031  *** 
 Small Banking Portfolio 
EU 0.020  *** 0.957  ***               0.040  *** 
Japan 0.050  *** 0.917  *** 0.000 
U.S. 0.179  *** 0.838  *** 0.002 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
The parameters a
2
i, b
2
i and n
2
i  pertain to the diagonal matrices A, B and Ν in the VAR-BEKK specification in 
equation (3). Significance of a
2
i and b
2
i indicates time variation in volatility, whereas significance of n
2
i 
indicates asymmetric response of the conditional volatility to negative news, where the magnitude of the effect 
is given by the estimated value of the n
2
i parameter. 
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Table 6.   Shock Transmission across Insurance Sectors of Different Regions: EU, Japan, U.K., U.S. 
The following table summarizes the return and volatility transmission effects among insurance-industry portfolios across markets. These portfolios contain 
all the insurers from one market.  The first three rows in each panel show the spillover effects while the next three rows show the spillover shifts during the 
crisis.  The estimated transmission coefficients have been categorized into return and volatility transmission effects.   
 
 
 
Impacted Markets 
 
  
EU 
  
Japan 
  
U.K. 
  
U.S. 
  Return Transmission Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
 1 Cross-Return 1 (θi1)  0.022 2.36 ** 0.109 1.78 * 0.072 2.98 *** 0.056 2.40 ** 
2 Cross-Return 2 (θi2)  0.073 2.71 *** -0.146 -1.82 * 0.036 3.74 *** 0.008 0.96   
3 Cross-Return 3 (θi3)  0.043 1.96 * 0.110 1.60   0.048 1.99 ** -0.036 -1.37   
4 Change in Cross-Return 1 (γi1)  -0.018 -1.05   0.000 0.01   -0.045 -1.26   -0.009 -0.12   
5 Change in Cross-Return 2 (γi2)  -0.034 -0.87   0.025 0.23   -0.059 -1.60 
 
-0.024 -1.11   
6 Change in Cross-Return 3 (γi3)  0.005 0.16   0.092 1.16   0.013 0.42   0.033 0.41   
 Volatility Transmission 
            7 Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) 0.000 0.83   0.168 0.92   0.007 1.12   0.096 2.23 ** 
8 Cross-Volatility 2 (gi2) -0.011 -2.28 ** 0.067 0.83   0.001 0.40   0.003 0.57   
9 Cross-Volatility 3 (gi3) 0.024 4.82 *** 0.183 1.11   -0.001 -0.65 
 
0.094 2.51 ** 
10 Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) -0.006 -2.66 *** 0.003 0.58   0.004 1.13   0.113 2.54 ** 
11 Change in Cross-Volatility 2 (zi2) 0.042 1.95 * -0.038 -0.60   -0.014 -1.72 * 0.022 2.37 ** 
12 Change in Cross-Volatility 3 (zi3) -0.001 -0.58   0.036 0.54   0.000 0.73   0.015 0.54   
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Cross-return/volatility i (i = 1-3, rows 1-3 / rows 7-9) represent the return (θi)/volatility (gi) transmission from each of the three countries to the fourth one during the whole sample period.  
That is, looking at the EU column, the impact of the Japanese, U.K. and the U.S. insurers on the EU insurance portfolio is represented by the coefficients numbered as 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  
Similarly, for the Japanese insurers, the impact of the EU, U.K. and the U.S. insurance portfolios on the Japanese insurance portfolio is measured by the coefficients numbered as 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively.  The same pattern applies for the remaining countries.  For instance, the impact of the cross-return/volatility spillover of the UK on the US market is -0.036/0.094. 
Change in Cross-return/volatility i (i = 1-3, rows 4-6 / rows 10-12) represent the change in the return (γi)/volatility (zi) transmission from each of the three countries to the fourth one during the 
crisis period.  That is, looking at the EU column, the incremental impact of the Japanese, UK and the US insurers on the EU insurance portfolio is represented by the coefficients numbered as 
1, 2 and 3, respectively.  Similarly, for the Japanese insurers, the incremental impact of the EU, UK and the US insurance portfolios on the Japanese insurance portfolio is measured by the 
coefficients numbered as 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  The same pattern applies for the remaining countries.  For instance, the change of the cross-return/volatility spillover of the UK on the US 
market is 0.033/0.015. 
Note: The full magnitude of the cross-sectional return and volatility transmission effect over the crisis period is given by (θi + γi) and (gi + zi), respectively. That is, the total cross-
return/volatility spillover of the UK on the US market is 0.000/0.094 (-0.036 + 0.033 / 0.094 + 0.015).  Note here that insignificant coefficients are not taken into account. 
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Table 7.    Cross-Market, Cross-Industry Shock Transmission  
The following table summarizes the return and volatility transmission effects among the U.S. banking portfolios and the insurance sector 
portfolios of the remaining three markets, namely EU, Japanese and U.K. market. The first three rows in each panel show the spillover effects 
while the next three rows show the spillover shifts during the crisis.  The estimated transmission coefficients are categorized as return and 
volatility transmission effects.  
 
 
 
Impacted Markets 
 
 
EU-Insurance Japan-Insurance U.K.-Insurance U.S.-Bank 
 Return Transmission Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
 1 Cross-Return 1 (θi1)  0.040 3.47 *** 0.100 1.45   0.082 3.63 *** -0.005 -0.27   
2 Cross-Return 2 (θi2)  0.089 3.43 *** -0.154 -1.87 * 0.036 3.40 *** -0.001 -0.23   
3 Cross-Return 3 (θi3)  0.039 0.96   0.221 1.83 * 0.080 1.90 * -0.013 -0.66   
4 Change in Cross-Return 1 (γi1)  -0.003 -0.14   -0.009 -0.08   -0.074 -2.15 ** 0.075 1.05   
5 Change in Cross-Return 2 (γi2)  -0.087 -2.25 ** -0.040 -0.27   -0.032 -1.76 * 0.008 0.34   
6 Change in Cross-Return 3 (γi3)  0.036 0.78   0.056 0.44   -0.030 -0.64   0.259 3.10 *** 
 Volatility Transmission 
            7 Cross-Volatility 1 (gi1) -0.001 -0.47   0.084 0.16   0.009 2.35 ** 0.020 1.61   
8 Cross-Volatility 2 (gi2) 0.047 1.74 * 0.027 0.76   0.001 1.13   0.000 0.98   
9 Cross-Volatility 3 (gi3) 0.004 0.55   0.104 0.17   0.000 -0.28   0.005 0.42   
10 Change in Cross-Volatility 1 (zi1) -0.002 -0.61   0.000 -0.36   -0.005 -1.22   -0.001 -0.47   
11 Change in Cross-Volatility 2 (zi2) 0.001 0.20   -0.005 -0.49   -0.028 -0.59   0.017 2.47 ** 
12 Change in Cross-Volatility 3 (zi3) 0.006 2.05 ** 0.017 0.23   0.003 0.44   -0.001 -0.68   
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Cross-return/volatility i (i = 1-3, rows 1-3 / rows 7-9) represent the return (θi)/volatility (gi) transmission from each of the three countries to the fourth one during the whole 
sample period.  That is, looking at the US column, the change on the impact of the EU, Japanese, and the UK insurers on the US banking portfolio is represented by the 
coefficients numbered as 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  The same pattern applies for the remaining countries.  For instance, the impact of the cross-return/volatility spillover of the 
UK on the US market is -0.013/0.005. 
Change in Cross-return/volatility i (i = 1-3, rows 4-6 / rows 10-12) represent the change in the return (γi)/volatility (zi) transmission from each of the three countries to the 
fourth one during the crisis period.  That is, looking at the US column, the incremental impact of the EU, Japanese, and the UK insurers on the US banking portfolio is 
represented by the coefficients numbered as 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  The same pattern applies for the remaining countries.  For instance, the change of the cross-
return/volatility spillover of the UK on the US market is -0.259/-0.001. 
Note: The full magnitude of the cross-sectional return and volatility transmission effect over the crisis period is given by (θi + γi) and (gi + zi), respectively.  That is, the total 
cross-return/volatility spillover of the UK on the US market is 0.259/0.000 (-0.013 + 0.259 / 0.005 – 0.001).  Note here that insignificant coefficients are not taken into account. 
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Table 8.        Interdependence between the Aggregated (Global) Banking and Insurance Portfolios 
The following table summarizes the return and volatility transmission effects between the aggregated 
banking and insurance portfolios.  The first row in each panel shows the spillover effects while the 
second row shows the spillover shifts during the crisis.  The estimated transmission coefficients are  
categorized as return and volatility transmission effects. 
 
 
 
Impacted Markets 
 
 
Bank Insurance 
  
Return Transmission Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
 1 Cross-Return (θi1)  0.038 1.83 * -0.001 -0.04   
2 Change in Cross-Return (γi1)  0.103 3.24 *** -0.126 -3.24 *** 
  
 
Volatility Transmission Coeff. Z-stat.   Coeff. Z-stat. 
 3 Cross-Volatility (gi1) 0.015 4.48 *** 0.019 3.37 *** 
4 Change in Cross-Volatility (zi1) 0.000 -0.89   0.015 1.36   
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Cross-return/volatility i (i = 1) represent the return (θi)/volatility (gi) transmission from one portfolio to the other during the 
whole sample period.  That is, looking at the Global-Bank column, the impact of the Global-Insurance portfolio on the Global-
Banking portfolio is represented by the coefficients 1, and vice versa.  For instance, the impact of the cross-return/volatility 
spillover of the insurance on the banking industry is -0.038/0.015. 
Change in Cross-return/volatility i (i = 1) represent the change in the return (γi)/volatility (zi) transmission from one portfolio to 
the other during the crisis period.  That is, looking at the Global-Bank column, the incremental impact of the Global-Insurance 
portfolio on the Global-Banking portfolio is represented by the coefficients 1, and vice versa.  For instance, the change of the 
cross-return/volatility spillover of the insurance on the banking industry is 0.103/0.000. 
Note: The full magnitude of the cross-sectional return and volatility transmission effect over the crisis period is given by (θi + γi) 
and (gi + zi), respectively.  That is, the total cross-return/volatility spillover of the insurance on the banking industry is 
0.141/0.015 (0.038 + 0.103 / 0.015 + 0.000).  Note here that insignificant coefficients are not taken into account. 
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Appendix 1.  Time Series of Banks/Insurers Equity Value 
 
The following figures represent the daily movements of the banks/insurers equity values.  In 
order to demonstrate the value of the portfolios in a better manner, the initial values of these 
portfolios are rebased at the 100 level at the beginning of the sample period.  The area to the 
right of April 2, 2007 represents the crisis period (April 2, 2007 till March 9, 2009).  On April 
2, 2007, the largest U.S. sub-prime lender - New Century Financial - filed for bankruptcy. 
 
 
Panel A.   Banking sector portfolios across markets 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B.   Insurance sector portfolios across markets 
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